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INTRODUCTION
IT IS REMARKABLE and well known that Nash [20] provided a unique arbitration scheme for two-person bargaining games. Luce and Raiffa [16] reconsidered Nash's work and discussed its relation to the problem of social choice by giving an n-person modification of the Nash axioms for the two-person case. Sen [25] also pointed out this relationship and critically discussed Nash's scheme as a solution of social choice.
In the present paper we would like to carry their idea further and formulate the rationality criteria from which we derive Nash's arbitration scheme as a unique possible social welfare function in view of the social choice theory that has been developed since the work of Arrow [1] . Under a different approach from that adopted here, DeMeyer and Plott [4] provided a social welfare function by using "relative intensity" of preferences, in which Nash's scheme appeared as a special case.
A nonempty set of alternatives, denoted by X, is a set of social states that could be obtained as the result of the social decision process. The society of individuals, denoted by N, is the set of the individuals in the social decision process. N is assumed to be finite with cardinality INI = n, i.e., N = {1, . . ., n}. Here we assume the existence of a distinguished alternative xo which represents one of the worst states for all individuals that we may imagine, e.g., we may imagine ali the members of the society die. The existence of such an alternative may also be explained by Isbell's argument that the utility space of an individual is bounded. ' We call this alternative an origin and evaluate the social welfare by considering relative increases of the individuals' welfare from this position. We note that we never assume a status-quo as an origin. Operationally an origin can be chosen arbitrarily according to cases. For example, in problems of consumer choice, the origin may be chosen as the n-tuple of consumers' initial endowments, which is often implicitly assumed when one considers the welfare effect of competitive equilibria. However, in general the origin should be regarded as one of the worst states that can occur for the individuals. We will discuss this point and provide examples in a subsequent section.
With the above definition in mind, we always associate the origin xo with X. Let X* = X u {xo}; we call X* the basic space of alternatives. In the following, however, we will consider the probability distributions over X* and regard them as the possible alternatives for the social choice problem. We give two reasons for this supposition. The first is that elements of uncertainty undoubtedly play an important role in the economy and should be included even in welfare economic theory. But one may object to this view because the uncertainty of economy follows a specific probability distribution and it is unreasonable to assume all probability distributions over X*. Though this observation may be right, we do not in general specify the nature of the probability distribution and once we derive a reasonable welfare function under this supposition, we may apply it to a social choice problem with a specific probability distribution according to cases. The second is that the basic space of alternatives X*. often may be determined by individuals' strategic behavior and they may well use mixed strategies in this case. We define some notations to introduce the elements of uncertainty in our problem.
Let ai (i = 1,... , t) be any alternatives in X* and a = (a,,... , at) be a probability distribution, i.e., it lai = 1 and ai~ O (i = 1,... , t). Then, by (alai * ... * atat), we mean the lottery which has t possible outconies ai with probabilities ai, respectively. For a subset A of X*, let m(A) denote the set of lotteries whose outcomes are any finite number of alternatives belonging to A, and we call m (A) the mixed extension of A. If A is finite, m (A) is clearly the set of lotteries whose outcomes are alternatives belonging to A. We call a lottery in m(X*) a mixed alternative, and we call an original alternative in X* a pure alternative. Then we call m (X*) the space of alternatives. It is assumed that each individual has a weak ordering Ri over m (X*) that satisfies the von Neumann and 23 Morgenstern utility axioms. We use the following notation:3 aPib for -bRia, (1. 1) aIib for aRib and bRia.
We have already introduced the origin xo and explained its interpretation. With that interpretation in mind, we assume Hence the society is indifferent between the case in which every individual has a chance to get the money and the case in which one of the individuals has no chance to get it. This seems to violate an intuitive understanding of the principle of equity.
We regard, in general, the rationality criteria for the society as a whole as different from those for the individuals themselves. This is the reason we do not postulate that the social preference relation should satisfy the von Neumann and Morgenstern utility axioms.7
THE RATIONALITY

CRITERIA AND THE POSSIBILITY THEOREM
From many social welfare functions defined in Section 1, we would like to select only one function as a possible candidate for a reasonable social welfare function. For this purpose, we will postulate several plausible rationality criteria that social welfare functions should satisfy. The class of rationality criteria with which we will be concerned is the one specifying how social preference should vary in response to variations in individual preferences.
The first condition is the most fundamental property called Pareto optimality. 
THE UNIQUENESS OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION
In this section we will show that the Nash social welfare function is uniquely determined by Conditions I, II, III, and IV.
Let a social welfare function R = W(p) be given and let X have at least 3 alternatives other than xo. As we will use a strong lemma due to Osborne [22] , a weak ordering on the positive orthant of En, denoted by E+, is introduced. Let x and y be any elements in E +. We choose arbitrarily two alternatives a and b (#xo) from X* and define utility functions ui so that they satisfy ui(a)=xi forall ieN, i= 1,. n).
EXAMPLES
We are now in a position to exemplify the usefulness of the introduction of the origin to our purpose, and examine whether the Nash social welfare function fits well our intuitive understanding of social choices. In the second example, we consider a situation which is similar to that in a counterexample of Harsanyi [11] directed against the maximin principle of Rawls [24] , since this counterexample also seems to work against the Nash social welfare function at first glance. The socially most preferred alternative is ((1/2)x1*(1/2)x2). This does not violate our intuition. Suppose next that if individual 2 takes the medicine, then he recovers with only probability 1/100. Even in this case, the socially most preferred alternative is still ((1/2)x1*(1/2)x2). This may contradict our intuition. One may well insist that, in this case, the appropriate probability of the choice of X2 should be very small or zero. This objection is similar to that of Harsanyi against the maximin welfare function. The objection will be answered by a more complete description of the situation in our case.
When one raises this objection, he thinks of the situation as if he replaces the individuals by himself. Then the utility function of each individual cannot necessarily be independent of the state of another. But, in the above definition of utility function, each individual is interested in his own state and is not affected by the state of another. This is the reason why one feels that our result may violate his intuition. If one agrees that the utility function of each individual is independent of the state of another, he would not find the reason to insist that the appropriate probability of choice of x2 should be very small or zero. Then, if one still has this insistence, one should change the definition of utility function u1 and u2 so that This formulation will represent one's observation and the Nash social welfare function suggests that the appropriate probability of choice of x2 should be very small or zero. This result is consistent with one's intuition. Furthermore since ul(D, L) and u2(L, D) are very small, in the preceding case where individual 2 recovers with probability 1/2 by taking the medicine, the socially most preferred alternative (pox, * pOx2) will be seen to be very close to ((1/2)x1 * (1/2)x2) but still P? >P2
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have established the notion of the Nash social welfare function and Nash social welfare indices. As the indices have a simple analytical form, some positive analysis based on the indices would be of interest. We would like to stress the importance of conceptual connections between game theory and social choice theory. This general recognition has been growing, as the pioneering work of Farquharson [ [14] , and others have shown. The socially most preferred alternative with respect to the Nash social welfare function is generated from the corresponding bargaining process which will be a special case of n-person bargaining games. Then it would be most interesting to extend the analysis in order to relate some theory of general n-person bargaining games to social choice theory. This seems to shed new light on fields of game theory, social choice theory, and the theory of justice.
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